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Entrepreneurs in low-income and minority neighborhoods encounter numerous prob­
lems in securing capital. To address this capital gap this paper considers a new role for 
private foundations as community development venture capitalists (CDVCs). It is sug­
gested that through grant making and program-related investments, foundations may 
assume an equity stake in neighborhood-based entrepreneurs and acting as CDVCs 
apply lessons from the value-added component of private equity financing, including 
drawing on their expertise, professional contacts and financial resources to contribute to 
entrepreneurial efforts in the inner city.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is much discussion and documentation of the problems in securing capital 
encountered by entrepreneurs in low-income and minority neighborhoods. The 
explanations include those which are common to many entrepreneurs— l^imited 
experience, lack of personal assets to use as collateral, and insufficient access to 
patient, high-risk, value-added equity capital. In the “farm system” where new 
ventures are spawned the capital markets are characterized by a lack of informed 
buyers and sellers and high transaction costs, the antithesis of an efficient market. 
Due to this inefficiency research indicates that there is a substantial capital gap in 
seed and start-up financing (Fiet 1995; Freear, Sohl & Wetzel, 1995; Mason & 
Harrison, 1992). The gap ranges from around $25,000 at the low end, the point at 
which the money raised from friends and family and second mortgages runs out, to 
the high six figures on the upper end, the time when the venture becomes attractive 
enough to catch the eye of venture fund investors. At this critical early stage of the
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entrepreneurial venture, private equity investors provide the largest source of 
equity financing for emerging high growth ventures (Freear, Sohl & Wetzel 1994).
Compounding the capital gap for entrepreneurs in the inner city are the rela­
tively high risks associated with ventures in low income neighborhoods (with rel­
atively high crime rates and limited local buying power) and racial discrimination. 
Given their lack of access to traditional sources of capital, there may be benefit 
from non-traditional sources—including private and institutional venture capital 
investors—funding “neighborhood” entrepreneurs. Lending further credence to 
the role of private equity financing is research indicating the possibility of nonfi- 
nancial motives underlying some venture capital decisions. Such motives include 
a wilUngness to accept a lower return in order to support local economic develop­
ment and minority entrepreneurs and similar nonfinancial incentives (Hoffman 
1972; Sullivan 1994; Wetzel 1983). However, it is most common for venture cap­
italists first to come into contact with prospective entrepreneurs through profes­
sional and/or informal networks. Unfortunately, neighborhood-based and minority 
entrepreneurs have traditionally been outside these networks, and unable to con­
nect with these investors.
To fill this “compounded” capital gap encountered by entrepreneurs in low- 
income and minority neighborhoods this paper considers a new expanded role for 
private foundations as “community development venture capitalists.” There can be 
great variety of investments made by private philanthropic organizations to foster 
community development which fall within their fiduciary obligations. For exam­
ple, the target of some grant money could be private ventures with significant 
potential for generating benefits beyond personal profit in low income and minor­
ity communities.^ Other investment avenues for private foundations funders could 
be more similar to traditional equity positions. For example, program-related 
investments (PRIs) could be used to take an equity stake in promising neighbor­
hood-based entrepreneurs.^ This would help the new ventures overcome the prob­
lem of limited access to capital, effectively spread risk between entrepreneur and 
foundation-funder, and at the same time allow for the eventual recycling of invest­
ment money.
This paper is exploratory. It draws on a unique case study to consider the 
potential role of private foundations as community development venture capital­
ists. In the conclusion, some lessons from the value-added component of venture 
capitalists will be considered, including how foundations might draw on their 
expertise and professional contacts (e.g., with financial and legal institutions), as 
well as their own financial resources to contribute to entrepreneurial efforts in the 
inner city. The target of investments would be private entrepreneurs with special 
commitment to inner city neighborhoods and with significant potential for their 
activities to result in the realization of private and community-wide benefits.
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The case study involves an in-depth examination of an innovative privatization 
initiative in New York City in which city-owned housing is being transferred over 
to neighborhood-based entrepreneurs. The Neighborhood Entrepreneur Program 
(NEP) is a joint effort of the NYC Partnership (a non-profit privately funded orga­
nization whose membership includes many of the Fortune 500 companies head­
quartered in NYC) and its subsidiary organization the NYC Housing Partnership 
(mainly concerned with increasing the supply of affordable housing), the City of 
New York (Department of Housing Preservation and Development), and the Rock­
efeller Foundation. With the NEP, the city is selling some of its in rent properties 
(property which the city took over ownership after non-payment of taxes) to pri­
vate businesses. The city has restricted this privatization initiative to neighbor­
hood-based entrepreneurs who must meet specific criteria indicative of their 
potential to provide long-term benefits to the communities in which they would 
own property.
A major national private foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, has invested 
in the “Neighborhood Entrepreneurs” through their participation in NEP and have 
helped the Entrepreneurs establish industry knowledge and contacts, in a manner 
similar to the way that many successful private investors and venture capital funds 
work with the companies they invest in. This value-added component of early 
stage equity investing, where private investors and venture capital funds invest 
their know-how and access to contacts as well as their capital in the ventures they 
finance, is a unique feature of the early stage equity markets (Ehrlich et al 1994; 
Harrison & Mason 1992; Freear, Sohl & Wetzel 1995). As discussed below, the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s experience with NEP suggests lessons for other founda­
tions and important areas for future inquiry.
II. NEP: THE PROMOTION OF 
NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED ENTREPRENEURS
The Neighborhood Entrepreneurs Program commenced in the fall of 1994. It 
included 11 “cluster neighborhoods” (in Central and East Harlem, Central Brook­
lyn, and the South Bronx) each with approximately 10 buildings and 100 housing 
units. A survey of tenants in the properties included in NEP indicated that: 70% of 
cluster households had no one employed; households in the clusters had an average 
income of less than $7,000 per year; 25% of tenants had moved to their apartments 
from homeless shelters; and 71% of households were headed by women.  ^In addi­
tion, many of the residents had severe problems with drug and alcohol abuse.
Under NEP, in rem properties are being sold to private businesses. However, 
NEP is more than a privatization effort. NEP targets opportunity to a particular 
group of businesses, it includes objectives other than economic efficiency, and it 
involves public and other support of private ownership. To participate in the NEP,
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businesses had to be based (i.e., currently manage property) in the neighborhoods 
where program activity was concentrated. Individual clusters were assigned to a 
Neighborhood Entrepreneur selected in a competitive process. Selection was based 
on criteria (see discussion below) which gave priority to small minority-owned 
firms in their early/start-up phase. Many of the firms which applied had no previ­
ous property ownership experience and desired to use their participation in NEP to 
increase the size and scope of their business operations.
The support of private ownership took many forms in NEP, including below 
market rate financing for the Entrepreneurs, low cost technical and managerial 
support of Entrepreneurs, assistance to Entrepreneurs in hiring new personnel, and 
rent subsidies for tenants. The subsidy of private Neighborhood Entrepreneurs was 
justified by: (1 ) concerns for the quality of life, equity/equal opportunity, and eco­
nomic efficiency in the cluster neighborhoods; and (2 ) recognition of the negative 
consequences city-wide associated with the deterioration of neighborhoods and the 
social infrastructure of the City.^ The hope of NYC’s Department of Housing Pres­
ervation and Development (HPD) and its main program partners the New York 
City Housing Partnership (the “Housing Partnership”) and the Rockefeller Foun­
dation was that Neighborhood Entrepreneurs would provide better service to in 
rem residents (than the city government and Entrepreneurs/Businesses based out­
side the cluster areas) and that enhancement of in rem properties would eventually 
increase local property values and encourage additional private investment. In 
addition, there was the issue of goverrraient inefficiency and cost in managing in 
rem housing—it cost the City of New York more than $100 million dollars per 
year to manage in rem properties. Turning these properties over to Neighborhood 
Entrepreneurs, even with the ‘additional’ cost of subsidizing their ownership and 
management, could save the City money.
A second related goal of NEP was to generate employment opportunities for 
residents of in rem properties. The Rockefeller Foundation funded the NYC Hous­
ing Partnership to conduct a one-year pilot employment project as a component of 
NEP. The objective was to test the potential for inducing Entrepreneurs and Con­
tractors (hired to rehabilitate cluster properties) to hire and train unemployed ten­
ants for entry level positions in construction, property management and 
maintenance created through the program. Its fiirst year goal was to place 100 ten­
ants in jobs, half in construction jobs and the other half in employment with Entre­
preneurs.
To achieve this second goal, the Housing Partnership and Rockefeller Founda­
tion sought to organize a support infrastructure of community-based social service 
providers/advocacy organizations (CBOs) and organizations affiliated with an 
employment training network. A key consideration was that the training, social 
services and other needs of hired tenants receive attention, so that tenants could 
meet employer’s expectations and successfully make the transition to work.
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The rationale for NEP was not that the private market alone (i.e., privatization) 
would alleviate the problems with in rem properties and in the cluster neighbor­
hoods— t^he private market had failed, that was one of the main reasons why the 
properties were in rem.  ^The program was designed to achieve a particular type of 
private market, blending market incentives with community goals. Program design 
took into account the reality that socio-economic conditions and the history of 
neglect of the cluster property (and neighborhoods in which cluster property is 
concentrated) were deterrents to the type of private market investment that was 
desired (i.e., investment which would contribute to the neighborhood revitalization 
and to the quaUty of Ufe of current residents). The potential external benefits from 
private Neighborhood Entrepreneur efforts, and profound problems with the ‘sta­
tus quo’ (i.e., the City spending millions of dollars a year managing the properties 
and at the same time developing the reputation as its own ‘worst landlord’) justi­
fied NEP.
Investing in Neighborhood Entrepreneurs 179
in . NEP’s FIRST YEAR EXPERIENCE:
WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY
In its first year NEP had significant accomplishment. This included attracting a 
pool of nearly 100 (Neighborhood Entrepreneur) applicants, which included thirty- 
five applicants that met the rigorous threshold qualifying criteria; the selection and 
retention of eleven highly qualified and committed Neighborhood Entrepreneurs 
(see more detailed discussion below); and improved housing conditions and tenant 
services, as reported by the tenants themselves and the community-based advocacy 
organizations representing the tenants. To date, there has been limited improve­
ment in community-wide conditions and property values and investment levels 
have not changed significantly, however, this is not surprising given the short ten­
ure of program effort. The most significant shortcoming to date, has been the small 
number of in rem residents that have found employment through NEP—only 17 
tenants have been employed by the Entrepreneurs. This is significantly below the 
target of 100.  ^The short-term employment results are not surprising and highlight 
some of the problems for any program geared towards in rem residents (or similar 
populations). Most residents are simply not ready for and/or interested in employ­
ment, regardless of any short-term effort. Of the 1,642 housed in NEP property 
(and included in the tenant survey), only 203 (12 percent) indicated an interest in 
employment through NEP.^ Of those, over ten percent reported no particular skills 
or career interest related to NEP employment. Of the remaining tenants reportedly 
interested in employment through NEP, less than two-thirds had any relevant 
experience for employment in NEP-related j obs. *
In spite of the short-term shortcomings the longer term prospects are encour­
aging. The best prospects for NEP is tied to the long-term business viability and
sustained commitment of Entrepreneurs to the cluster neighborhoods. Thus, the 
success of NEP strongly depended on the selection and performance of Entrepre­
neurs and the Entrepreneurs’ ability to meet specific program objectives (e.g., min­
imize dislocation, upgrade housing conditions, hire tenants) while maintaining 
profitable business operations. The selection of Entrepreneurs was therefore of 
critical importance.
The Housing Partnership (with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation) 
played the lead role here and appears to have done an excellent job. The selection 
process was extensive and guided by clearly specified criteria. The criteria 
included that Entrepreneurs had to: (1) be neighborhood-based for-profit business 
owners; (2) have managed at least 50 residential units, or have managed an aver­
age of 50 units in the last three years, without owning or having a substantial 
ownership interest in more than 250 units of housing; (3) have experience with 
oversight or performance of rehabilitation or repair of occupied multi-family 
housing; (4) meet one of the following two criteria in full and not exceed the 
maximum limit for the other criterion by more than 50%; (a) gross armual busi­
ness revenue (average for the last 3 years) not exceeding $1.5 million; and (b) 
combined personal and corporate net worth (exclusive of primary personal resi­
dence) not exceeding $1.5 million.
Housing Partnership staff undertook rigorous review of program applicants, 
instituted a formal rating system, conducted personal interviews with Entrepre­
neurs and their current tenants, and visited properties under the management of 
Entrepreneurs. The Housing Partnership also consulted with CBOs and local pub- 
Uc officials on the selection of Entrepreneurs. The selection process was very com­
petitive. Ninety-five Entrepreneurs applied. Of those applicants, thirty-five met the 
threshold criteria (described above). Those that met the threshold were then ranked 
according to: management experience, financial experience, rehabilitation experi­
ence, work experience with non-profits, and neighborhood base. Neighborhood 
base (i.e., criterion #1 above) was the most heavily weighted. Eleven Entrepre­
neurs were selected and all accepted the offer and all are still active. This is signif­
icant given the extensive requirements, time commitment and financial uncertainty 
involved with participation.
Compliance with the formal criteria ensured that the Entrepreneurs had strong 
ties to the cluster neighborhoods which they were assigned. All but one of the 
Entrepreneurs was a member of a minority group (this is significant in an industry 
where the large majority of businesses are not minority owned). There was some 
variation in terms of Entrepreneur’s previous experience—^more than half had no 
previous ownership experience, two were larger property owners/managers (with 
over 2,000 units under management), half were smaller companies with fewer than 
200 units under management.
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Four key factors help explain why the Neighborhood Entrepreneurs offer 
promise for long-term job opportunities and community revitalization. These 
include: (1) the “grounding in the neighborhood” of entrepreneurs; (2) the profit 
motive and low risk for entrepreneurs; (3) the links between profit and community 
improvement; and (4) the establishment of support infrastructure for the entrepre­
neurs.
Grounding in the Neighborhood
The motivations of ‘grounded’ Entrepreneurs appear (from personal inter­
views and observations of initial NEP-related activities) to go beyond short-term 
profit. In many ways the Entrepreneurs can relate to the difficulties and problems 
experienced by their cluster tenants, as they seem to truly care about the residents 
and have a sincere interest and commitment to the improvement of the neighbor­
hoods in which they will own NEP property. In addition, they have not only dollars 
and their professional reputation at stake with their performance, but also their per­
sonal reputation in the community and city.
As mentioned earlier. Neighborhood Entrepreneurs must be relatively small 
business operations (criteria #2 and #4-). This necessitates a ‘hands-on’ownership 
approach by the large majority of Entrepreneurs. The result will be reinforcement 
of the Entrepreneur’s awareness of the connection between their contributions to 
conmiunity improvement (e.g., employing tenants, fighting drug traffic) and prof­
itability. In addition, their frequent personal contact with residents can help to 
overcome mis-perceptions about tenants and the tenants mis-perceptions about 
property owners. This contact can foster cooperation, and in the language of col­
lective action theory, ‘mutual gains seeking.’
Having Entrepreneurs who are grounded in the neighborhoods where they 
operate have other benefits, including the likelihood that individual manager/own­
ers can serve as mentors and role models in the community, and contribute to 
employment and service networking possibilities for residents. In addition, there is 
evidence that minority business owners (as are all but one of the Neighborhood 
Entrepreneurs) tend to hire minorities more than non-minority owners, regardless 
of where their businesses are located.
Profit Motive and Low Risk
The main incentive for attracting a highly quaUfied pool of Neighborhood 
Entrepreneurs was the combination of (a) the profit potential, together with (b) low 
‘up-front’ financial commitment. HPD, the Housing Partnership and the Rock­
efeller Foundation assumed virtually all the initial financial costs, while the Neigh-
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borhood Entrepreneurs have the potential to earn significant profits, especially if 
the buildings and neighborhoods are ‘turned around.’
While the initial financial commitment by the Entrepreneurs is small, NEP 
requirements of Entrepreneurs are significant. To ensure that the properties will be 
transferred over to their ownership-(after a period in which properties are being 
rehabilitated and the Housing Partnership assumes interim ownership) Neighbor­
hood Entrepreneurs must meet several program conditions, including that they: (1) 
work with the conununity-based organizations assigned to their clusters to address 
the needs of tenants; (2) attend program meetings and meet with Housing Partner­
ship staff on a regular basis; (3) not displace current tenants; and (4) demonstrate 
‘willingness’ (not formally defined, but monitored by Housing Partnership staff) to 
employ tenants. Finally, while their initial financial stake was low, the Entrepre­
neurs’ stake/risk in terms of reputation and potential effect on future business pros­
pects was significant, as we highUght below.^
The financial arrangements with the Entrepreneurs is intended to encourage 
long-term ownership, with most profits (at least in the near-term) coming through 
management fees.^ ® The capital costs of renovation are funded by city and federal 
grants, which are structured as a low-cost loan. There are strong indications that in 
the event of revenue shortfalls, the city would exercise forbearance on its loans and 
allow the Entrepreneurs sufficient cash flow to operate their property profitably.
HPD and the Housing Partnership appeared to have too much at stake on the 
‘success’ of NEP and the Entrepreneurs to not offer some guarantee (however 
modest and informal it may have been) that the Entrepreneurs would earn some 
profit from their participation in NEP.^  ^ This was not a deterrent to the program 
given the fact that even with significant financial obUgations to the Entrepreneurs, 
significant savings could be realized by removing the properties (and hundreds of 
millions of dollars in management expenses) from the City’s direct responsibility.
The greatest uncertainty remaining for the Entrepreneurs is the ‘up-side’ (i.e., 
profit) potential of the properties. This will be most strongly affected by the future 
rent stream and the future market/re-sale value of the property which will be 
most strongly influenced by the physical condition of property and neighborhood 
conditions. This suggests that Entrepreneurs, even with some guarantee from the 
City that they will profit from ownership of NEP property, still have strong incen­
tive to commit themselves to property maintenance and investing in conmiunity 
improvement.
Because the rents and market value of the buildings they will own depends on 
the maintenance of the buildings and the physical, economic, and social conditions 
in the larger cluster neighborhoods, the Entrepreneurs have a strong material 
incentive to provide quality services to secure good long-term tenants and to con­
tribute to neighborhood improvement through such efforts as promoting the 
employment of tenants.Furthermore, with the assignment to Entrepreneurs of a
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cluster of properties, rather than scattered sites, they are positioned to capture the 
benefits from the local community revitalization to which they contribute. These 
tendencies to invest in property maintenance and neighborhood improvement are 
reinforced by the ‘unique’ position of Entrepreneur’s in the property ownership/ 
management industry in NYC.
All the Entrepreneurs perceive NEP and ownership of property (in neighbor­
hoods similar to the cluster neighborhoods) as their main business growth oppor­
tunity. For the large majority, NEP represents their single opportunity to ‘step-up 
in the business’ and increase their earnings. NEP provided approximately half of 
the Entrepreneurs their first opportunity to own property. Prior to NEP, their own­
ership opportunity was limited by a lack of capital and experience and discrimina­
tory practices in real estate and banking. Furthermore, the Entrepreneur’s 
relatively small scale of other business activities and their commitment of money, 
sweat equity, and reputation to NEP, makes cluster properties a significant part of 
their business portfolio and fosters commitment and effort. And finally, the Entre­
preneur’s main competitive advantage (as property owners) is their ability to draw 
on their indigenous experience and hands-on ownership approach in neighbor­
hoods like the cluster areas.
NEP offered a truly unique business opportunity for Neighborhood Entrepre­
neurs. This together with the prospects for future rounds of NEP (i.e., in rem priva­
tization by the city government) reinforced the Entrepreneur’s commitment to: (1) 
NEP and its success (thus furthering the chances of program expansion and their 
chances to participate in future rounds of NEP and similar types of initiatives 
undertaken by HPD and the Housing Partnership): (2) their property (i.e., the 
buildings they own in the clusters); and (3) the cluster neighborhoods and resi­
dents. Indicative of their business focus and where they see profit opportunity, sev­
eral of the Entrepreneurs have already branched out from real estate to open 
accounting, travel, and construction businesses in the cluster neighborhoods. '^*
Linkage Between Profit and Community Improvement
Closely related to the profit incentive is the perceived and real linkage between 
individual Entrepreneur’s profit and their contributions to community improve­
ment. All of the Entrepreneurs recognized some potential linkage between their 
future profits and community improvement. Most cited the lowered cost of opera­
tion and maintenance with reduced crime and drug traffic as the most direct link. 
Also frequently mentioned were the increased demand for, and value of, apart­
ments and property as cluster conditions improve.
With regard to the employment of residents, the main perceived benefits were 
that residents would be more likely to pay their rents, be able to pay higher rents 
over time, and be able to contribute to community improvement. Furthermore, ten-
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ants hired by Entrepreneurs and/or Contractors working in the cluster would have 
a ‘double stake’ in their work, as it would directly affect both the conditions of 
their apartment and income. Many of the Entrepreneurs mentioned that tenant 
employees were potentially more valuable (i.e., productive) than ‘other’ workers 
because they would be more sensitive to the problems and needs of residents and 
would always be ‘on the job,’ and therefore helpful with building maintenance and 
security at all hours of the day.
To sustain Entrepreneur’s commitment to community improvement will 
require the continued perception and reality of private pecuniary benefit from more 
general contribution to community improvement (e.g., hiring of tenants, efforts to 
reduce drug traffic). There is strong likelihood that most Entrepreneurs will, at 
some point, feel that their efforts to improve the community are in vain and that the 
long-term profit potential is not significant. For this reason, it is important that the 
network between Entrepreneurs, CBOs, HPD, the Housing Partnership and the 
Rockefeller Foundation be continually strengthened. Entrepreneurs will need pos­
itive reinforcement and supportive actions to not abandon their commitment to 
property and tenants and their contributions to conomunity improvement.
The Establishment of Support Infrastructure
All start-up businesses need support, especially if they have to fight discrimi­
nation and are currently outside industry networks. The Housing Partnership, in 
partnership with HPD and the Rockefeller Foundation, played the critical role in 
establishing the necessary infrastructure, i.e., support network, for the Neighbor­
hood Entrepreneurs. The Housing Partnership has drawn on its unique experience 
and industry connections (through the NYC Partnership) in housing, banking and 
community development to establish the necessary support.
The Entrepreneurs have benefitted from their frequent contact with Housing 
Partnership staff. The main contact involves Partnership staff ‘walking’ Entrepre­
neurs (collectively and individually) through various stages of NEP. The least 
experienced Entrepreneurs have benefitted the most from Housing Partnership 
staff efforts, particularly with securing financing, and legal and tax issues.
Perhaps, most importantly, the Housing Partnership and Rockefeller Founda­
tion have helped Entrepreneurs establish beneficial relations with bankers, CBOs, 
and the city government. For example, one Entrepreneur commented that before 
his involvement with NEP he could not get a banker to meet with him. After being 
introduced to bankers by the Housing Partnership, they are competing for his busi­
ness and inviting him to lunch.
The Housing Partnership also helped Entrepreneurs overcome business diffi­
culties as they arose. And, not least significantly, the Housing Partnership was able 
to rely on their good standing and prominence together with the reputation and sta-
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tus of the Rockefeller Foundation to assure the Entrepreneurs “that things would 
work out” when there was uncertainty and/or confusion about particular aspects of 
NEP—such as the previously discussed financial uncertainty preceding final 
financial arrangements with HPD.
Summary of NEP Progress to Date
The Neighborhood Entrepreneur Program (NEP), while still early in imple­
mentation, is overcoming some traditional obstacles hampering successful minor­
ity business development including lack of access to markets, lack of access to 
capital, and lack of managerial ability. NYC government, through its Department 
of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD), provided market opportunities 
for the businesses. The NYC Housing Partnership, through its connection to 
banks, provided access to capital and technical assistance for Entrepreneurs. And 
the Rockefeller Foundation through the provision of grant money to the NYC 
Housing Partnership has helped to upgrade the Entrepreneurs’ capacity to suc­
ceed. Careful selection of Entrepreneurs and strong support of their efforts 
(mainly by the Housing Partnership with grant money provided by the Rock­
efeller Foundation) has helped to ensure that Entrepreneurs are experienced and 
capable managers.
Over the longer term, there could be city-wide benefits from NEP. NEP’s 
requirements of Neighborhood Entrepreneurs (e.g., hiring of tenants, improving 
housing conditions) along with the prominence of program participants (e.g.. 
Housing Partnership, HPD and the Rockefeller Foundation) can contribute to the 
upgrading of industry standards with regards to the hiring of neighborhood resi­
dents and contributions to broader community development. Furthermore, there is 
a good possibility that Entrepreneurs will replicate their efforts, i.e., expand their 
efforts in assigned clusters and in similar neighborhoods in other parts of the city. 
In this way, the cluster neighborhoods and the city can benefit from the Entrepre­
neur’s financial motivation to leverage the lessons and learning from their experi­
ence with NEP.
The NEP program has embryonic elements of systemic change. Over time, 
residents can get better housing, more access to needed services, increased job 
opportunities, and general community improvement; minority Entrepreneurs can 
get property ownership opportunities, and better access to markets, credit, and 
profits; intermediaries (e.g., the Housing Partnership) can play a larger role in 
improving the delivery of services to neighborhood where they have a significant 
investment; and, government can get reduced social welfare costs and increased 
tax revenue.
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rV. INVESTING IN NEIGHBORHOOD ENTREPRENEURS: 
STRATEGIC INVESTMENT BY FOUNDATIONS
The experience with NEP suggests a potential benefit fi-om foundations and other 
private supporters of community development complementing their traditional 
grant making to non-profits and community-based groups, with indirect and direct 
investment in private ventures that show promise to contribute to community 
development. Insight about the potential value of foundations and others investing 
in private entrepreneurs, and the relationship between funder and fundee, can be 
gained from the research on the private venture capital market.
Institutional and private venture capital money has been credited with fueling 
the growth and development of some of the most irmovative and fastest growing 
companies in the U.S. and the world. When the young Scot Alexander Graham 
Bell needed money in 1874 to complete his early experiments on the telephone 
Boston attorney Gardiner Green Hubbard and Salem leather merchant Thomas 
Sanders helped out. Later, these same two individuals put up the equity capital to 
start the bell telephone company in Boston (Lample 1989). In the 1930s and 1940s, 
members of the Rockefeller, Bessemer, and Whitney families invested in promis­
ing early stage ventures (Gompers 1994). This same involvement of private inves­
tors in early stage ventures continues today. A portion of initial capital for Apple, 
Federal Express, Starbucks, and Microsoft (to name only a few) did not come from 
‘traditional’ sources— b^ank financing or personal and/or family savings— b^ut from 
private equity investors willing to take a risk on a start-up venture that demon­
strated some unique promise. Similarly, prospective Neighborhood Entrepreneurs 
lack access to traditional sources of capital because of their small savings, limited 
experience and history of discrimination, particularly in housing markets. So they 
too could benefit from non-traditional sources of capital at the critical early stage 
of development.
Foundations and other conmiunity development funders can play the role of 
community development venture capitalists. The dual investment criteria of foun­
dations would be financial return on investment and return in the form of progress 
on community revitalization. The main use of foundation grants and/or subsidized 
loans (e.g., PRIs) would be: (a) as ‘start-up’ funding; (b) to assist entrepreneurs in 
developing necessary skills and industry (e.g., banking, accounting) contacts/con­
nections; and (c) assimiption of some of the initial risk of new ventures. This is 
similar to the role private investors and venture capitalists play with promising 
new ventures. With start-ups, private investors provide patient capital to ventures 
with the prospect of a long- term capital gain commensurate with the risk inherent 
in early stage investing. These investors want to ensure that the new venture is 
motivated by the potential long-term return from their effort, however, there is also 
benefit to making sure that the entrepreneur has something at risk to further their
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commitment and stake in the venture. For the Neighborhood Entrepreneurs, while 
their initial financial stake was low, their stake/risk in terms of reputation and 
potential effect on future business prospects was significant.
Early stage equity investors invest largely in individuals, since at the early 
stage the major assets of the ventures are the entrepreneurs themselves. The criteria 
which they use include: (1) personal integrity; (2) business acumen; (3) conmiit- 
ment to their work; and (4) willingness to work hard, i.e., ‘go the extra step’ to be 
successful. Since the private investor is committing funds for a substantial period 
of time, during which the venture is likely to face a myriad of problems and oppor­
tunities, the relationship with the entrepreneur is critical. These are very similar to 
the informal criteria used by the Housing Partnership in the selection of Neighbor­
hood Entrepreneurs in light of the fact that both groups are investing at the early 
stage of the firm.^^ Additionally, the Housing Partnership used more formal crite­
ria and ratings to assess what we call ‘grounding in the community’ as an indica­
tion of the potential to realize external benefits from the Entrepreneur’s activities.
There can be great variety of investments made to foster community develop­
ment. The target of investments, we are suggesting here, would be private ventures 
with special skills and commitment and with significant potential for generating 
benefits beyond personal/firm profit. Investment could be similar to that taken by 
the Rockefeller Foundation in NEP. With NEP the investment was in the form of 
a grant which helped to subsidize the start-up costs of Neighborhood Entrepre­
neurs likely to provide long-term external benefits to the communities in which 
they would own property. Furthermore, the Rockefeller grant provided an incen­
tive for the Entrepreneurs to engage in particular activities (e.g., the hiring of ten­
ants) capable of bringing significant external benefit to the conmiunity as a whole.
Other investment avenues for community development funders could be 
more similar to traditional equity positions. For example, program-related invest­
ments could be used to take an equity stake in promising neighborhood-based 
Entrepreneurs. Through an equity investment the community development ven­
ture funder, much like the private investor and venture capitalist, would be 
investing in precisely the area where credit financing alone cannot sustain the 
appetite for capital. While access to credit is critical for many smaU business 
owners, early stage high growth ventures cannot be capitalized with additional 
debt. For the early stage innovative venture, the major asset of the firm is the 
entrepreneur. These firms are short on hard assets and cannot offer the collateral 
required by most lenders. By focusing only on the credit side of the balance sheet 
and its high fixed cost interest payment burden, a substantial debt to equity 
imbalance will persist, further restricting the firms access to the capital that is 
critical for the long term growth and survival of the venture. Through the 
assumption of an equity position, the corrununity development funder would help 
the new ventures overcome the well-documented problem of limited access to
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capital, effectively spread risk between entrepreneur and foundation/funder, and 
at the same time allow for the recycling of investment money.
The most successful private investors and venture capitalists bring more than 
money to the new ventures they fund. Especially in the early stage equity financ­
ing, the venture capitalist is a ‘value-added’ investor. In addition to capital, the 
investor/funder brings industry contacts, professional guidance and personal sup­
port to the relationship with the entrepreneurs. In this role the investor and entre­
preneur become partners in the long term growth and development of the firm and 
as equity investors, share with the entrepreneur the financial rewards of this 
growth. Research indicates that entrepreneurs typically derive value from their 
individual investors that is above and beyond the provision of equity funding 
(Freear, Sohl & Wetzel 1996). This value-added component suggests lessons for 
foundations and other community development funders. To be successful they can 
not be passive investors. Start-up ventures—especially if they have to fight dis­
crimination— n^eed patient capital and expertise. More specifically, they need help 
with the following: (1) establishing relations/contacts in the industry (e.g., with 
bankers, contractors, city officials); (2) developing “in-house” industry expertise; 
and (3) establishing their professional reputation.
The Housing Partnership, in partnership with the Rockefeller Foundation, pro­
vided much of this ‘non-pecuniary’ support to Entrepreneurs. And as we have sug­
gested, their contributions were a main factor contributing to the progress made to 
date.
V. CONCLUSION
Initial findings indicate that the return from the investment and related activities by 
the Rockefeller Foundation will be viable businesses: serving an “underserved” 
population; helping to enhance the quality of life of residents; increasing employ­
ment opportunities for residents; and contributing to community improvement. 
The experience with the NEP also suggests lessons from the venture capital market 
which are useful for inner-city development. More specifically, there are potential 
benefits from private foundations and other supporters of community development 
complementing their traditional grant making to service oriented non-profit com­
munity organizations with indirect and direct investment in private ventures. Con­
sidering the “compounded” capital gap faced by entrepreneurs in low-income and 
minority neighborhoods, much can be derived from the role of foundations as com­
munity development venture capitalists. Private equity investors are currently par­
tially filling the capital gap through patient equity capital and value added 
investing at the early stage of the ventures development. Through the experience 
of the private investor conmiunity, foundations can take on the role of community 
development venture capitalists and provide the patient capital, access to industry
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contacts and opportunities to develop entrepreneurial skills that are critical to the 
survival and growth of the firm. As community development venture capitalists, 
foundations can begin to address the true capital formation challenge facing entre­
preneurs in inner-city and minority neighborhoods.
Important lines of future inquiry include: (1) how private foundation funding 
of new ventures in the inner city can best be blended with public support and pri­
vate investment; (2) appropriate exit strategies, i.e., when should subsidy be 
removed and private ventures be expected to “stand on their own”; and (3) how to 
aid foundations in thinking more strategically about their role as conmiunity devel­
opment venture capitalists. These and other important questions will be considered 
in on-going assessment of the NEP and comparing and contrasting the experience 
in NEP with similar efforts in other cities and regions.
NOTES
1. Benefits from increased entrepreneurial activity in low income neighborhoods could include 
general community improvement—e.g., reduction in crime—as more local residents are 
employed in local business establishments and as the entrepreneurs become neighborhood lead­
ers and mentors for their employees and neighborhood youth.
2. Among the U.S. grant making community the number of PRI-makers is very small. Since the 
beginning of PRI activity, 74 funders have disbursed or guaranteed PRIs totaling $718 million. 
Nearly one-third of total PRI amount has been loaned or invested by the Ford Foundation, and 
close to another 10 percent by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Only 7 per­
cent of total PRIs have been used to “promote self-sufficiency in recipients.” (The Foundation 
Center, “Program-Related Investments: A Guide to Funders and Trends,” 1995).
3. The survey further indicated that most of the households were receiving some kind of public 
assistance. For example, in 7 of the 11 clusters every respondent who answered the question 
reported receiving some kind of public assistance. For the remaining clusters, more than 70% 
of respondents reported receiving public assistance. (Non responses to this question make it 
hard to quantify for the survey sample as a whole). Completing the tenant profile, approxi­
mately two-thirds of the households were African-American and another quarter Hispanic, and 
half of residents had lived in their buildings for more than 10 years. There were some differ­
ences in socio-economic characteristics across the clusters. In general, the clusters in Brooklyn 
were the most segregated with the highest percentage of African Americans and the clusters in 
the Bronx had the highest percentage of Hispanic residents. There was also some variation in 
the percentage of residents who were formerly homeless, ranging from 8 to 44 percent.
4. Neighborhood decline has concentrated effects in the neighborhoods themselves and on its res­
idents. However, it also has significant negative consequences city-wide. Neighborhood 
decline contributes to increased crime, decline of employable workforce, and the reduction in 
the quality of life in individual neighborhoods and the city. It also affects the attractiveness of 
a city for businesses and residents, and thus is of concern to the private sector (employing city 
residents and with investment in the city) and to the public sector (concerned for the general 
public good).
5. Market failure—more often than not—coincided with and was exacerbated by generalized 
neighborhood decline, followed by ill-conceived government interventions.
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6. The Employment Pilot made some progress increasing labor demand—there were more job 
offers by the Entrepreneurs (to tenants) than there were tenants ready for employment. How­
ever, a qualified supply of workers from the tenant pool was not forthcoming.
7. The number of tenants who reportedly expressed an interest in the employment pilot (as indi­
cated by them filling out the employment assessment forms) is a questionable figure. This was 
revealed when Housing Partnership staff followed-up with tenants. However, the pool of qual­
ified tenants is still estimated by the Housing Partnership at approximately 200.
8. Thirty-five had self-reported maintenance experience, 31 construction experience, 15 experi­
ence as a receptionist, 14 had experience with computers in an office and 12 had secretarial 
experience.
9. The structuring of the transfer of property from the City to the Entrepreneurs was negotiated 
between HPD and the Housing Partnership. The financial arrangements were not finalized until 
June 1995, several months after the Entrepreneurs had all made significant commitment to 
meeting with NEP officials and attending to the needs of the assigned NEP properties. This sup­
ports our earlier observations of the Entrepreneur’s faith in the Housing Partnership and HPD, 
i.e., that they would negotiate a ‘good deal’ for them, and of their apparent patience toward this 
program.
10. The City 's financial commitment included $100,000 for the rehab of each unoccupied unit and 
$50,000 for each occupied unit. It also included a provision that prior to their ownership of the 
properties the Entrepreneurs would be reimbursed for working capital expenses and would get 
management and development fees from the City. A portion of the latter would be payable to 
the City as the purchase price for the buildings once rehabilitation was completed. The after- 
rehabiUtation rent structure included a profit to the owner-managers, provided they complied 
with all subsidy record-keeping and tenant eligibility requirements and achieved market rents 
on vacant units.
11. An indication of the low financial risk placed on the Entrepreneurs (and high risk assumed by 
NYC) are the terms of purchase and sale. In a letter dated June 1,1995 fi:om Jerry Salama, Dep­
uty Commissioner of HPD, to Kathy Wylde it was stated that “the City in determining the final 
mortgage loan arrangement shall seek to ensure affordability for existing tenants, adequate cash 
flow and long-term financial viability.”
12. HPD restrictions on re-sale and the restrictions attached to federal subsidies make re-sale an 
unlikely source of profit in the short-term. In the long-term, however, it is not inconceivable 
that the Entrepreneurs could profit from re-sale, especially if the cluster neighborhoods are revi­
talized.
13. If at any time the profit potential (or perception of the potential) drops dramatically there will 
be an incentive to abandon properties. The City and/or Housing Partnership is suggesting that 
they would intervene if this was the case to change the financials such that Entrepreneur’s retain 
their commitment to their property. The city’s ability to forbear on its loan repayments is the 
key mechanism for adjusting to economic hardship over the next 30 years.
14. A problem with reliance on material incentives is that without an explicit non-displacement pol­
icy as a condition of program participation (and/or explicit financial incentive not to displace 
tenants). Entrepreneurs may tend to evict the more difficult or impoverished families from their 
buildings. (This could have mixed implications for community improvement.) However, if 
there are strong messages that displacement is undesirable (and/or incentives not to displace). 
Entrepreneurs will be reluctant to evict tenants. Another caution with the reliance on private 
incentive is that non-displacement will require continued subsidy of rents. The support commu­
nity (e.g., HPD and the Housing Partnership) will have to help ensure that these funds remain 
available for some tenants, even with changes in federal government programs.
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15. The informal assessment was done in extensive interviews and personal contact with prospec­
tive Entrepreneurs.
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